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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 American Capital Equipment, Inc. and Skinner Engine 
Company (collectively, “Skinner”), the debtors in this case, 
appeal from the District Court‟s order affirming the 
Bankruptcy Court‟s order, which converted Skinner‟s Chapter 
11 bankruptcy case to a Chapter 7 on the basis that its plan is 
patently unconfirmable.  Joining its appeal is Willard Bartel 
(“Bartel”), representative for the estate of an asbestos 
claimant.  Appellees are insurers (Travelers Casualty and 
Surety Company, Allianz Global Risks, Century Indemnity 
Co., Pacific Employers Insurance Co., Continental Casualty 
Co., Cont. Ins. Co., Fairchild Corp., Great American Ins. Co., 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., First State Ins. Co., Nat‟l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors, Firemans Fund Ins. Co. of OH, Liberty 
Mut‟l Ins. Co., Hartford Fire Ins. Co.) (collectively, 
“Insurers”), the legal representative for future asbestos 
claimants, the Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic, and the 
Interim Chapter 7 Trustee, Jeffrey J. Sikirica. 
The issue before us is whether a bankruptcy court can 
determine at the disclosure statement stage that a Chapter 11 
plan is unconfirmable without first holding a confirmation 
hearing.  We hold that a bankruptcy court has the authority to 
do so if it is obvious that the plan is patently unconfirmable, 
such that no dispute of material fact remains and defects 
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cannot be cured by creditor voting.  Additionally, we find that 
the plan in this case was patently unconfirmable, and that the 
Bankruptcy Court did not err in converting the case to 
Chapter 7.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Skinner was founded in 1868 as a manufacturer of 
steam engines for merchant ships.  From the 1930s through 
the 1970s, Skinner manufactured ship engines and parts 
allegedly containing asbestos.  In 1998, American Capital 
Equipment, LLC acquired all of Skinner‟s common stock, 
and secured a lien on Skinner‟s assets from PNC Bank to 
finance the purchase.  Based on Skinner‟s lack of cash flow to 
maintain operations or service its secured debt, Skinner and 
American Capital each filed petitions for bankruptcy relief 
under Chapter 11 in 2001. 
The Asbestos Claims 
 At the time that Skinner and American Capital filed for 
bankruptcy, over 29,000 asbestos claims were pending 
against Skinner.  Merchant mariners began bringing personal 
injury claims against Skinner in the 1980s.  The claims fell 
within federal admiralty jurisdiction, so they were assigned to 
a special maritime docket entitled “MARDOC.”  In 1991, the 
MARDOC cases were consolidated with cases from 87 other 
judicial districts by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the “MDL 
Court”).  In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. 
Supp. 415, 416-17 (J.P.M.L. 1991).  In May 1996, the MDL 
Court administratively dismissed the remaining MARDOC 
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claims without prejudice, noting that the claimants had 
“provide[d] no real medical or exposure history,” and had 
been unable to do so for months.  In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. 
Litig. (No. VI), No. 2 MDL 875, 1996 WL 239863, at *1-2 
(E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996).  It also ordered that these 
“asymptomatic cases” could be activated if the respective 
plaintiffs began to suffer from an impairment and could show 
(1) “satisfactory evidence [of] an asbestos-related personal 
injury compensable under the law”; and (2) “probative 
evidence of exposure” to defendant‟s products.  Id. at *5.  In 
2002, the MDL Court ordered that administratively dismissed 
cases remain active for certain purposes (e.g., entertaining 
settlement motions and orders, motions for amendment to the 
pleadings, etc.), and in 2003, clarified that the administrative 
dismissals were “not intended to provide a basis for excluding 
the MARDOC claimants from participating in settlement 
programs or prepackaged bankruptcy programs[.]”  In re Am. 
Capital Equip., 296 F. App‟x 270, 272 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), Order 
Granting Relief to MARDOC Claimants with Regard to 
Combustion Eng’g, Inc., No. 2 MDL 875 (E.D. Pa. Feb.19, 
2003)). 
 Since the administrative dismissals, only a few dozen 
of the thousands of MARDOC asbestos claims against 
Skinner have met the criteria for reinstatement.  Appellants 
do not dispute that none of those claims have resulted in a 
judgment or settlement against Skinner.  See In re Am. 
Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. 415, 421-22 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2009). 
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Skinner’s Insurance 
 Skinner claims entitlement to insurance coverage 
under primary comprehensive general liability insurance 
policies, as well as various excess policies, provided by 
Insurers.  The policies contain standard clauses obligating the 
insured to cooperate in the defense of claims against it and 
prohibiting it from settling claims without the Insurers‟ 
consent.  For example, Travelers‟ Insurance primary policies 
state: 
“[Travelers] shall have the right and duty to 
defend any suit against the insured seeking 
damages on account of such bodily injury or 
property damage, even if any of the allegations 
of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, 
and may make such investigation and settlement 
of any claim or suit as it deems expedient . . . .” 
Travelers‟ excess policies contain a similar statement.1  An 
additional clause in all Travelers‟ policies states that: 
“The Insured shall cooperate with [Travelers] 
and, upon [Travelers‟] request, assist in making 
settlements, in the conduct of suits . . . and the 
insured shall attend hearings and trials and 
                                              
1 “[Travelers] shall defend any suit . . . [and] may 
make such investigation of settlement of any claim or suit as 
it deems expedient.” 
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assist in securing and giving evidence and 
obtaining the attendance of witnesses.” 
 Prior to the bankruptcy petition filing, Skinner‟s 
primary insurers defended the asbestos claims against 
Skinner.  The parties entered into a defense cost-sharing 
agreement under which the primary insurers and Skinner each 
agreed to pay a portion of the costs. 
The Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plans 
 Skinner has proposed five bankruptcy plans since 
filing for bankruptcy.  Only the Fifth Plan is at issue here, 
although its relationship to several other plans – particularly 
the Third Plan – has some relevance. 
 Appellants filed the Disclosure Statement and Joint 
Plan of Reorganization for their First Plan on June 6, 2001.  
The plan proposed a sale of Skinner‟s assets to the president 
of American Capital‟s parent corporation.  The plan provided 
that asbestos claimants would be paid from any insurance 
proceeds available at the time of a final judgment.  Numerous 
objections from creditors (though not from asbestos 
claimants) led Skinner to amend the plan. 
 Appellants filed the Second Plan on September 12, 
2001.  The plan proposed a sale of Skinner‟s assets to the 
highest bidder.  It also included future asbestos claimants in 
the asbestos claimants‟ class (“Asbestos Claimants”) by 
providing for a trust funded through insurance proceeds.  The 
Bankruptcy Court approved the disclosure statement and 
scheduled a confirmation hearing for October 25, 2001.  
 16 
However, before the confirmation hearing could occur, the 
voting creditors rejected the Second Plan. 
 On October 29, 2002, the Bankruptcy Court approved 
a sale of Skinner‟s assets, and it sold all of its assets for 
$1,165,000, which went to PNC Bank in satisfaction of its 
secured lien.  PNC Bank agreed to set aside $35,000 towards 
the costs of processing asbestos claims.  Travelers agreed to 
not oppose the sale, provided that Skinner would not 
immediately seek conversion or dismissal, but give creditors 
and interested parties 180 days “to negotiate a consensual 
plan of reorganization[.]”  Neither Travelers nor creditors or 
other interested parties ever proposed such a plan.  In March 
2003, after the sale of Skinner‟s assets, the Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors moved to convert the case to Chapter 7.  
The motion was then continued several times so the parties 
could attempt to negotiate a workable plan with Skinner. 
 On February 24, 2004, Appellants filed the Third Plan, 
proposing creation of a § 524(g) asbestos trust pursuant to the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The trust would be funded by the 
insurance recoveries, the $35,000 from PNC Bank, and the 
common stock of “Reorganized Skinner,” and would provide 
for all present and future Asbestos Claimants.  The plan 
proposed to adopt a claims submission standard (known as 
the Johns-Manville Personal Injury Standard), which required 
each Asbestos Claimant to meet two criteria:  (1) show a 
medically diagnosed asbestos-related injury, and (2) show 
exposure to Skinner‟s asbestos-containing products.  The plan 
also provided for a surcharge, which would give Skinner the 
right to ten percent of cash from insurance actions and 
policies to pay creditors through a Plan Payment Fund. 
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 On February 2, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court approved 
the disclosure statement and set a confirmation hearing for 
March 10, 2005.  Skinner‟s creditors voted to accept the 
Third Plan. 
 On February 22, 2005, Travelers commenced a breach 
of contract action against Skinner (“Insurance Coverage 
Action”), claiming that the Third Plan breached its right to 
settle and defend claims and seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the alleged breach relieved Travelers of its coverage 
obligations under the policies.  Skinner then counterclaimed 
and filed a third-party complaint naming the other Insurers, 
and seeking a declaratory judgment in its favor.  On May 2, 
2005, the Bankruptcy Court filed orders denying Insurers‟ 
motions to withdraw reference of the adversary proceeding 
and other objections they had previously raised.  In re Am. 
Capital Equip., 325 B.R. 372 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005); In re 
Am. Capital Equip., 324 B.R. 570 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2005).  
The declaratory judgment action never advanced beyond the 
pleadings stage, but rather, was dismissed without prejudice 
after the Bankruptcy Court converted the case to Chapter 7.  
Order of June 3, 2009, In re Am. Capital Equip., Adv. No. 05-
2253 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. June 3, 2009). 
 In June 2005, Insurers filed a Motion to Dismiss 
(“American Capital I”), arguing pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1112(b) that the plan was no longer proceeding in good 
faith, and no longer served a legitimate Chapter 11 purpose.  
At the hearing on August 15, 2005, the Bankruptcy Court 
noted that Skinner did not have a going concern, and stated 
that without a going concern, it could not approve a trust 
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pursuant to § 524(g).
2
  Skinner moved to stay further 
proceedings in order to modify the plan, and the Bankruptcy 
Court granted the motion. 
After conducting hearings, the Bankruptcy Court 
denied Insurer‟s motion to dismiss, and the District Court 
affirmed, finding that the case served a legitimate bankruptcy 
purpose in that it maximized value to creditors, and that 
Skinner was not seeking a litigation advantage through the 
bankruptcy process.  In re Am. Capital Equip., LLC, No. 06-
0891 (W.D. Pa. May 11, 2007).  We affirmed, and remanded 
the case to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings.  See 
In re Am. Capital Equip., 296 F. App‟x at 270. 
During the pendency of the motion to dismiss 
proceedings, Skinner filed its Fourth Plan.  The plan again 
provided for a surcharge, which would give Skinner the right 
to twenty percent of cash from insurance actions and policies 
to pay creditors through the Plan Payment Fund.  However, 
this time the plan did not use a § 524(g) trust, but rather 
provided that a trustee would use criteria similar to those in 
the Third Plan to allow or disallow asbestos claims.  Asbestos 
Claimants who did not want to use the system could use the 
tort system, but any judgment would be subject to a 
temporary injunction until all bankruptcy-allowed claims had 
been paid.  In order to cover the plan‟s administrative costs 
until the surcharge provided sufficient revenue, the plan 
would be partly funded by a loan from a law firm 
                                              
2 The Bankruptcy Court‟s determination in this regard 
is not now before us. 
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representing the Asbestos Claimants.  The Bankruptcy Court 
rejected the injunction and questioned the surcharge, giving 
Skinner further time to amend its plan. 
 Skinner filed a Fifth Plan, removing the temporary 
injunction against judgments for Asbestos Claimants who 
chose to pursue traditional tort remedies.  It still included a 
twenty percent surcharge for Asbestos Claimants who 
decided to opt in to the plan‟s settlement process.  The 
Surcharge would be used to pay creditors through the Plan 
Payment Fund, and fund the claims resolution process called 
the “Court Approved Distribution Procedures” (“CADP”).  
Specifically, the CADP provides that: 
“[e]ach Asbestos Claimant shall maintain full 
and complete ownership of his or her Asbestos 
Claim, including, without limitation, the right to 
prosecute or settle any Asbestos Claim, but 
upon the Asbestos Claimant submitting his or 
her claim to the CADP, he or she shall thereby 
have agreed to pay the Surcharge Cash from 
any amounts paid on account of the Asbestos 
Claim under and through the CADP.” 
Skinner acknowledged at least twice that the Plan would not 
work without the Surcharge.
3
 
                                              
3 At a hearing on January 10, 2006, the Bankruptcy 
Court inquired, “[C]an you do this without doing the 20 
percent?”  Skinner‟s counsel replied, “No.”  Again, on May 7, 
2009, the Bankruptcy Court asked: 
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 The CADP “provide[s] a basis for the Plan Trustee to 
evaluate Asbestos Claims[,]” and would implement claims 
allowance criteria similar to those in the Third and Fourth 
Plans.  If Insurers disagree with the Trustee‟s determination, 
the CADP would permit them to elect a Court Determination 
by the Bankruptcy Court.  Court Determinations would 
require the Bankruptcy Court to decide “solely on the basis of 
the documentation in the Asbestos Claim file when the 
Asbestos Claim was categorized, whether the Asbestos Claim 
                                                                                                     
THE COURT: . . . is there any way you propose 
this plan without the 20 percent surcharge? 
[Skinner‟s counsel]: Your Honor, the 20 percent 
surcharge is to be used to pay all the other creditors 
and non-asbestos creditors in the case.  So without the 
20 percent surcharge or some surcharge, unsecured 
creditors will receive nothing. 
THE COURT: So the answer is no, you 
wouldn‟t do it without the 20 percent. 
[Skinner‟s counsel]: Do it with a ten percent 
surcharge.  We could do it with five. 
THE COURT: No, you‟re going to need a 
surcharge of some kind. 
[Skinner‟s counsel]: We need a surcharge of 
some kind so that we have a distribution to the rest of 
the creditors in the case. 
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should be categorized as a Scheduled Disease.”  In making 
this determination, the Bankruptcy Court would employ 
“baseball arbitration procedures,” meaning that it “may select 
either the amount proposed by the Plan Trustee or the 
counteroffer of the Asbestos Insurance Company.  The 
Bankruptcy Court may not select another amount as part of 
the Court Determination.”  The Bankruptcy Court‟s decision 
would be binding on the Insurers and not appealable.  The 
CADP does not state whether Asbestos Claimants would be 
permitted to appeal a decision that favors Insurers. 
The Present Appeal 
The Bankruptcy Court held hearings on the Fifth 
Plan‟s disclosure statement.  In May 2009, it issued an 
opinion finding that the plan was facially unconfirmable, 
because it was not proposed in good faith and was forbidden 
by law in contravention of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3), and was 
not feasible pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).  In re Am. 
Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. 415, 423-24 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
2009).  Finding that Skinner would be unable to propose a 
confirmable plan, the Bankruptcy Court converted the case to 
a Chapter 7 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).  Id. at 426-27. 
Skinner and Bartel appealed the Bankruptcy Court 
order to the District Court, which consolidated the appeals 
and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court‟s order in Skinner Engine 
Co. v. Allianz Global Risk U.S. Ins. Co., No. 09-0886, 2010 
WL 1337222 (W.D. Pa. March 29, 2010).  Skinner and Bartel 
each appealed the District Court decision, and on May 12, 
2010, we consolidated both appeals. 
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this 
bankruptcy case under 28 U.S.C. §1334(a), and referred the 
cases to the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).  
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the District Court had 
jurisdiction over the Bankruptcy Court‟s order converting the 
case to Chapter 7.  We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
from the District Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(2004)
4
 and 
1291.  See In re Krystal Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Truck, 
Inc., 142 F.3d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1998).  On appeal, “we „stand 
in the shoes‟ of the District Court and review the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s decision. . . . review[ing] the Bankruptcy Court‟s 
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear 
error.”  In re Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 209 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). 
                                              
4 Pursuant to a 2005 amendment, the statute now lists 
28 U.S.C. § 158(d) as 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).  However, this 
case was filed in 2001, prior to the effective date of the 2005 
amendment, so as relevant, references to the Bankruptcy 
Code throughout this opinion refer to the previous version of 
the Code.  See In re Am. Capital Equip., LLC, 296 F. App‟x 
270, 276 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing the applicability of 
the pre-2005 statute in the present set of cases pursuant to the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-8, § 1501, 119 Stat. 23 (2005)); see 
also In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2008) (Bankruptcy 
Code‟s 2005 amendment not applicable to Chapter 11 case 
filed prior to amendment‟s effective date). 
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III. 
 Appellants raise three primary issues on appeal.  First, 
they challenge the Bankruptcy Court‟s procedure, claiming 
that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding the Fifth Plan to be 
unconfirmable without first holding a confirmation hearing.  
Second, they argue that the Bankruptcy Court substantively 
erred in finding that the Fifth Plan was patently, or facially, 
unconfirmable.  Finally, they argue that the Bankruptcy Court 
abused its discretion in converting its case from Chapter 11 to 
Chapter 7.  We will discuss each of these issues in turn. 
A. 
Appellants argue that the Bankruptcy Court erred in 
deeming its plan to be unconfirmable without first holding a 
confirmation hearing.  We disagree. 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3020(b)(2) 
states that “[t]he court shall rule on confirmation of the plan 
after notice and hearing[.]”  Based on the plain language of 
this Rule, our Sister Circuits have held that a bankruptcy 
court “must hold an evidentiary hearing in ruling on 
confirmation.”  In re Acequia, Inc., 787 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th 
Cir. 1986); accord In re Williams, 850 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 
1988).  The purpose of the hearing is for the bankruptcy court 
to “consider[] . . . objections raised by creditors, . . . [and] to 
determine whether the plan has met all of the requirements 
necessary for confirmation.”  In re Williams, 850 F.2d at 253. 
Although the “hearing on the disclosure statement may 
be combined with the hearing on confirmation of a plan[,]” 11 
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U.S.C. § 1125(f)(3)(2004),
5
 the Bankruptcy Court did not 
formally schedule the hearing as a confirmation hearing, but 
as a hearing to consider disclosure statement issues.  We must 
thus consider whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in making 
a confirmability determination based on the hearing. 
“Ordinarily, confirmation issues are reserved for the 
confirmation hearing, and not addressed at the disclosure 
statement stage.”  In re Larsen, No. 09-02630, 2011 WL 
1671538, at *2 n.7 (Bankr. D. Idaho May 3, 2011).  Courts 
have recognized that “if it appears there is a defect that makes 
a plan inherently or patently unconfirmable, the Court may 
consider and resolve that issue at the disclosure stage before 
requiring the parties to proceed with solicitation of 
acceptances and rejections and a contested confirmation 
hearing.”  Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Main St. AC, 
Inc., 234 B.R. 771, 775 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1999) (“It is now 
well accepted that a court may disapprove of a disclosure 
statement . . . if the plan could not possibly be confirmed.”); 
accord In re Miller, No. 96-81663, 2008 WL 191256, at *3 
(Bankr. W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2008); In re El Comandante Mgmt. 
Co., 359 B.R. 410, 415 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2006);  In re Mahoney 
Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 294 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002); In 
re Phoenix Petroleum Co., 278 B.R. 385, 394 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2001); In re Silberkraus, 253 B.R. 890, 899 (Bankr. C.D. 
                                              
5 This text was moved to 11 U.S.C. § 1125(f)(3)(C) 
following the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.  See 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005, Tit. IV, § 431, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 
(2005). 
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Cal. 2000); In re Brass Corp., 194 B.R. 420, 422 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tex. 1996); In re Felicity Assocs., Inc., 197 B.R. 12, 14 
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1996); In re Cardinal Congregate I, 121 B.R. 
760, 764 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Dakota Rail, Inc., 
104 B.R. 138, 143 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); In re Unichem 
Corp., 72 B.R. 95, 100 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Monroe 
Well Serv., Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 333 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
The rationale is that the court‟s equitable powers under 
11 U.S.C. § 105 “surely enable it to control its own docket” 
and thus, a “[c]ourt [should] not proceed with the time-
consuming and expensive proposition of hearings on a 
disclosure statement and plan when the plan may not be 
confirmable because it does not comply with [confirmation 
requirements].”  In re Kehn Ranch, Inc., 41 B.R. 832, 832-33 
(Bankr. S.D. 1984); see also In re Dakota Rail, Inc., 104 B.R. 
at 143 (“Only where the disclosure statement on its face 
relates to a plan that cannot be confirmed does the court have 
an obligation not to subject the estate to the expense of 
soliciting votes and seeking confirmation of the plan; 
otherwise, confirmation issues are left for later 
consideration.”).  Commentators agree that “[i]t appears to be 
within the discretion of the bankruptcy court to withhold 
approval of a disclosure statement if the accompanying plan 
is unconfirmable[.]”  The Disclosure Statement Hearing, 6 
Norton Bankr. L. Prac. § 110:15 (3d ed. 2012); accord 
Barbara J. Houser, et al, Disclosure Statements: Confirmation 
and Cramdown of Chapter 11 Plans, ST005 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 
2177 (2011) (“[N]umerous courts have heard objections to 
the disclosure statement based upon contentions that the 
accompanying plan of reorganization is nonconfirmable -- in 
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other words, if a plan is not confirmable on its face as a 
matter of law, then the court will withhold approval of the 
disclosure statement.”); 9C Am. Jur. 2d Bankr. § 2900 (“The 
bankruptcy court may consider objections and refuse to 
approve a disclosure statement when it is apparent that the 
accompanying plan is not confirmable.”). 
We find the reasoning of these many courts to be 
persuasive, and hold that a bankruptcy court may address the 
issue of plan confirmation where it is obvious at the 
disclosure statement stage that a later confirmation hearing 
would be futile because the plan described by the disclosure 
statement is patently unconfirmable.
6
  A plan is patently 
unconfirmable where (1) confirmation “defects [cannot] be 
overcome by creditor voting results” and (2) those defects 
                                              
6 We caution, however, that bankruptcy courts must 
“[e]nsure that due process concerns are protected” by, inter 
alia, providing sufficient notice to plan proponents, and 
taking care to not prematurely convert a disclosure statement 
hearing into a confirmation hearing.  In re Monroe Well Serv., 
Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 333 & n.10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); see 
also In re Larsen, No. 09-02630, 2011 WL 1671538, at *2 
(Bankr. D. Idaho May 3, 2011); In re U.S. Brass Corp., 194 
B.R. 420, 422 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996).  This case raises no 
such due process concerns; the Bankruptcy Court‟s hearings 
on the issues were lengthy and thorough, and its April 9, 2009 
order, which was served on plan proponents Skinner and 
Bartel, gave sufficient notice that confirmability issues would 
likely be considered at the May 7, 2009 disclosure statement 
hearing. 
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“concern matters upon which all material facts are not in 
dispute or have been fully developed at the disclosure 
statement hearing.”  In re Monroe Well Serv., 80 B.R. at 333.  
If no dispute of material fact remains and if defects cannot be 
cured by creditor voting or otherwise, then there is “nothing 
in either the language or logic of the Code requiring the court 
or parties to „grind the same corn a second time,‟ and we will 
not read into the Code the requirement of redundancy.”  In re 
Acequia, Inc., 787 F.2d at 1358-1359 (citation omitted) 
(noting that although confirmation requires an evidentiary 
hearing, courts need not ignore evidence already submitted).  
As we will discuss below, there was no error in the 
Bankruptcy Court‟s determination that the Fifth Plan was not 
confirmable, and that the confirmation defects cannot be 
cured and involve no material facts in dispute. 
B. 
Appellants argue that even if a Bankruptcy Court is 
permitted to make a confirmability determination at the 
disclosure statement stage, it erred in doing so here, because 
the plan is confirmable.  We disagree. 
A court shall confirm a plan only if, inter alia, it “has 
been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden 
by law[,]” and if it is feasible.  11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(3), (11); 
In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 243 n.59 (3d Cir. 
2004) (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11)).  The debtor has 
the burden of proving that a disclosure statement is adequate, 
including showing that the plan is confirmable or that defects 
might be cured or involve material facts in dispute.  Accord In 
re Curtis Ctr. Ltd. P’ship, 195 B.R. 631, 638 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
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1996); In re R & G Props., Inc., No. 08-10876, 2009 WL 
2043873, at *5 (Bankr. D. Vt. July 6, 2009). 
The Bankruptcy and District Courts found that the 
Fifth Plan did not meet the § 1129 requirements for 
confirmation.  In re Am. Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. at 
423-24; Skinner Engine Co., No. 09-0886, 2010 WL 
1337222, at *2.  We agree that the Fifth Plan is not 
confirmable on two separate and independently sufficient 
bases under § 1129(a):  (1) it is not feasible, and (2) it has not 
been proposed in good faith.
7
  We address each basis below, 
and find that the plan is patently unconfirmable. 
 1. Feasibility under § 1129(a)(11) 
 A plan is confirmable only if it is feasible, In re 
Combustion Engineering, 391 F.3d at 243 n.59, that is, if 
“[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the 
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of 
the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, 
unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the 
plan.”  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).  Even a planned liquidation 
“must be feasible.”  Accord In re Calvanese, 169 B.R. 104, 
107 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).  The Bankruptcy and District 
                                              
7
 The Bankruptcy and District Courts also found the 
plan to be unconfirmable on the basis that it is forbidden by 
law, but because a full analysis of the matter takes us into 
uncharted waters surrounding issues of state law, we decline 
to address whether such a third basis also renders the plan 
unconfirmable. 
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Courts found that the Fifth Plan was not feasible, and we 
agree. 
 Although § 1129(a)(11) does not require a plan‟s 
success to be guaranteed, see In re Applied Safety, Inc., 200 
B.R. 576, 584 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), the plan must 
nevertheless propose “a realistic and workable framework[.]”  
Hurricane Memphis, 405 B.R. 616, 624 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 
2009) (quoting In re Brice Road Devs., 392 B.R. 274, 283 
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2008)).  In other words, the plan must be 
“reasonably likely [to] succeed[] on its own terms without a 
need for further reorganization on the debtor‟s part.”  In re 
Applied Safety, 200 B.R. at 584; see also In re Quigley Co., 
Inc., 437 B.R. 102, 142 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (plan was not 
feasible where funding source was “speculative at best and 
visionary at worst”). 
 In considering feasibility, “a bankruptcy court must 
evaluate the possible impact of the debtor‟s ongoing civil 
litigation[.]”  In re Harbin, 486 F.3d 510, 519 (9th Cir. 2007).  
A plan will not be feasible if its success hinges on future 
litigation that is uncertain and speculative, because success in 
such cases is only possible, not reasonably likely.  Accord In 
re DCNC N.C. I, LLC, 407 B.R. 651, 667 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2009); In re Thompson, No. 92-7461, 1995 WL 358135, at 
*3-4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Cherry, 84 B.R. 134, 139 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); In re Rey, Nos. 04-B-35040, 04-B-
22548, 06-B-4487, 2006 WL 2457435, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 21, 2006). 
 Critically, in this case, the Fifth Plan‟s sole source of 
funding is the Surcharge, which would be obtained from 
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wholly speculative litigation proceeds.  The Fifth Plan also 
depends on the assumption that Asbestos Claimants will 
choose to use the CADP rather than the court system, and 
even then, the Plan will succeed only if enough Asbestos 
Claimants who use the CADP win recoveries and contribute 
sufficient Surcharge funds to the Plan Payment Fund.  This 
Plan is highly speculative, to say the least, not only because it 
is contingent on potential litigation winnings, but also 
because most of the claims have been administratively 
dismissed and have “thus far been . . . overwhelmingly 
unsuccessful.”  In re Am. Cap. Equip., LLC, 405 B.R. at 422.  
The Fifth Plan is simply not reasonably likely to succeed and 
therefore, is not feasible.  Furthermore, the feasibility issue 
cannot be cured, and no dispute of material fact remains, 
because Appellants admit that no plan will work without a 
Surcharge.  Thus, the feasibility issue renders the Plan to be 
patently unconfirmable pursuant to § 1129(a)(11). 
 2. Good Faith under § 1129(a)(3) 
 A plan is confirmable only if it is proposed in good 
faith.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).  The Bankruptcy and District 
Courts found that the Fifth Plan did not meet the § 1129(a)(3) 
good faith requirement.  We agree. 
 In analyzing whether a plan has been proposed in good 
faith under § 1129(a)(3), “the important point of inquiry is the 
plan itself and whether such a plan will fairly achieve a result 
consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”  In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 247 (quoting In 
re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 242 (3d Cir. 2000)).  
Specifically, under Chapter 11, the two “recognized” policies, 
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or objectives, are “preserving going concerns and maximizing 
property available to satisfy creditors[.]”  Bank of Am. Nat.’l 
Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 
434, 453 (1999) (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163, 
(1991)).  More generally, the Bankruptcy Code‟s objectives 
include: “giving debtors a fresh start in life,” Walters v. U.S. 
National Bank of Johnstown, 879 F.2d 95, 98 (3d Cir. 1989), 
“discourag[ing] debtor misconduct,” id., “the expeditious 
liquidation and distribution of the bankruptcy estate to its 
creditors,” Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Service Support 
Specialties, 124 F.3d 487, 489 (3d Cir. 1997), and achieving 
fundamental fairness and justice.  In re Kaiser Aluminum 
Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 339-43 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 a. American Capital I 
 When we last reviewed Skinner‟s bankruptcy 
proceedings in American Capital I, we analyzed whether the 
case was “proceeding in bad faith,” In re Am. Capital Equip., 
LLC, 296 F. App‟x at 274, or, as the District Court stated, 
whether the Third Plan “reflected a bad faith use of the 
bankruptcy process.”  In re Am. Capital Equip., No. 06-0891, 
at *9.  In so doing, we considered the objectives underlying 
Chapter 11, and determined based on the record before us at 
the time that Skinner‟s bankruptcy case was proceeding in 
good faith because the Third Plan‟s surcharge attempted to 
maximize the property available to satisfy creditors.  In re 
Am. Capital Equip., LLC, 296 F. App‟x at 274-75.  Skinner 
argues that our initial good faith determination and reasoning 
circumscribes our good faith determination here.  We 
disagree. 
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 A prior determination that a bankruptcy petition was 
filed or proceeded in good faith does not necessarily preclude 
a later inquiry into whether a plan under that petition is 
proposed in good faith for purposes of confirmation.  The 
question of whether a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition is filed 
in good faith is a judicial doctrine, distinct from the statutory 
good faith requirement for confirmation pursuant to 
§ 1129(a)(3).  In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 247 n.67; 
6 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. § 112:10 (3d ed. 2012).  The 
judicial doctrine inquires into the motivation for proceeding 
in bankruptcy, see In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 
384 F.3d 108, 121 (3d Cir. 2004), and “requires an 
examination of all of the facts and circumstances and depends 
upon an amalgam of factors, none of which is dispositive.”  6 
Norton Bankr. L. & Prac., supra, § 112:10.  In contrast, “the 
good-faith confirmation requirement is narrower and focuses 
primarily on the plan itself,” id., and on “whether such a plan 
will fairly achieve a result consistent with the objectives and 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”  In re Combustion Eng’g, 
391 F.3d at 247.  It might be that a bankruptcy case which is 
filed and proceeds in good faith nevertheless results in a plan 
that does not fairly achieve a result consistent with the 
objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Furthermore, information affecting the good faith 
determination might be added to the record throughout the 
process leading up to confirmation. 
 We found in American Capital I that the use of a 
surcharge maximizes property available to satisfy creditors, 
and that Skinner‟s case was therefore attempting to achieve a 
valid bankruptcy goal.  However, a company may pursue a 
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valid bankruptcy goal, yet in the end, propose a plan that is 
otherwise inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.  Thus, the 
fact that Skinner‟s case proceeded in good faith with a valid 
bankruptcy purpose, is not sufficient to assure us at the 
confirmation stage that the plan itself otherwise comports 
with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 In American Capital I, we did not deal with the same 
concerns that are now before us; we did not address 
confirmation, the Fifth Plan, or questions involving fairness, 
collusion, or conflict of interest.  See generally, In re Am. 
Capital Equip., LLC, 296 F. App‟x at 273-75; see also In re 
Am. Capital Equip., LLC, No. 06-0891, at *10 (JA1380) (“the 
issue before us is not . . . confirma[tion]”); id. at *14 (“We 
understand that the Insurers viewed this [Third] Plan as an 
insurance scam.  The Insurers might be right.  However, these 
are all issues that will be explored in the adversary 
proceeding, and, possibly, during plan confirmation 
proceedings regarding the now viable Fifth Plan.”).  Thus, our 
limited discussion in American Capital I, regarding whether 
Skinner was proceeding for purposes of achieving a valid 
bankruptcy purpose, does not now preclude us from 
considering whether the Fifth Plan will fairly achieve its 
purposes, and whether it is otherwise consistent with the 
objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.  We turn 
now to these questions. 
 b. The Fifth Plan 
 A plan is proposed in good faith only if it will “fairly 
achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of 
the Bankruptcy Code.”  In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 
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247 (emphasis added); see also Young v. United States, 535 
U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (“[B]ankruptcy courts . . . are courts of 
equity and „appl[y] the principles and rules of equity 
jurisprudence.‟” (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 
(1939)).  The Bankruptcy and District Courts found that the 
Fifth Plan was not proposed in good faith because it was 
collusive.  In re Am. Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. at 422-23; 
Skinner Engine Co., No. 09-0886, 2010 WL 1337222, at *1.  
We agree that collusive plans are not in good faith and do not 
meet the good faith requirement of § 1129(a)(3).  See In re 
PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d at 242-43 (proceeding with a 
good faith analysis under § 1129(a)(3) where collusion was 
the only alleged basis for arguing that the plan was not 
proposed in good faith).  However, we are not convinced the 
Fifth Plan is collusive because insurers have not pointed to 
any evidence of an agreement to defraud insurers.  Cf. 
Black‟s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (Collusion is “[a]n 
agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain something 
forbidden by law.”); Lincoln Printing Co. v. Middle W. Utils. 
Co., 74 F.2d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 1935) (“Collusion is . . . an 
agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person 
of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain any object 
forbidden by law[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The Bankruptcy Court, in fact, noted that 
“collusion” might not be the proper term for the Fifth Plan‟s 
good faith problem.  In re Am. Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. 
at 423. 
 Nonetheless, we agree that the Fifth Plan will not 
fairly achieve the Bankruptcy Code‟s objectives because it 
establishes an inherent conflict of interest under 
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circumstances that are especially concerning.  Cf. Coram 
Healthcare, 271 B.R. 228, 234-35 (Bankr. D. Del 2001) 
(finding § 1129(a)(3) good faith violation where debtor‟s 
CEO had an interest in one of Debtors‟ largest creditors). 
 First, as the Bankruptcy Court stated, the Fifth Plan 
sets up a system in which Skinner would be “financially 
incentivized to sabotage its own defense.”  In re Am. Capital 
Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. at 423.  Skinner is a defunct business 
without so much as a single employee remaining.  It has no 
assets to distribute to creditors or attorneys, and Skinner 
admits that the only way that creditors and attorneys can 
possibly be paid is if asbestos litigants win settlements against 
it (and pay the Surcharge).  Although settlements will be 
controlled by a Plan Trustee with no financial interest in the 
outcome of the proceedings, it is not as if Skinner can entirely 
remove itself from the process.  Rather, these settlements will 
likely require Skinner‟s involvement in both defense and 
discovery because the question of asbestos claimants‟ 
exposure to Skinner products is still at issue.  Thus, the Fifth 
Plan creates an inherent conflict of interest:  Skinner is 
required to cooperate in its defense, but will be incentivized 
to do otherwise. 
 Second, we are troubled by the fact that the CADP 
system creates this inherent conflict, while at the same time 
severely limiting or eliminating Insurers‟ ability to take 
discovery, submit evidence, contest causation, or appeal a 
decision, and all without the protective channeling injunction 
of § 524(g).  Appellants argue that similar provisions 
reducing insurers‟ procedural rights have been confirmed 
under other plans, but fail to cite to any plans that 
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simultaneously employed a similar surcharge.  In fact, 
Appellants do not cite to any examples of confirmed 
bankruptcy plans that sought to pay creditors using insurance 
dollars intended to compensate Asbestos Claimants for their 
personal injuries. 
 Finally, we are unconvinced by Appellants‟ attempts 
to compare the Fifth Plan with a § 524(g) trust, because the 
structure and objectives of a § 524(g) trust are inconsistent 
with the trust created under the Fifth Plan.  Although like a § 
524(g) trust, the Fifth Plan sets up a process for Asbestos 
Claimants to settle claims out of court, the similarities end 
there.  A § 524(g) trust is “funded in whole or in part by the 
securities of [one] or more debtors . . . and by the obligation 
of such debtor or debtors to make future payments, including 
dividends[.]”  11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II).  The trust fund 
is then used to pay Asbestos Claimants.  § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I), 
(IV).  The trust maximizes the value of the debtor‟s estate for 
creditors by allowing a debtor to channel all asbestos claims 
into the trust, so that the debtor and its affiliates or parent 
companies are not burdened by the asbestos claims.  
§ 524(g)(1)(A), (4)(A)(ii); see also Eric D. Green, James L. 
Patton, Jr., & Edwin J. Harron, Future Claimant Trusts and 
“Channeling Injunctions” to Resolve Mass Tort 
Environmental Liability in Bankruptcy: The Met-Coil Model, 
22 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 157, 160-64 (2005) (explaining that 
the § 524(g) channeling injunction increases investor 
confidence, and thus better enables the reorganized enterprise 
to meet creditor obligations and provide for future claimants).  
Ideally: 
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“[T]he [bankrupt] company remains viable. . . . 
[and] continues to generate assets to pay claims 
today and into the future. In essence, the 
reorganized company becomes the goose that 
lays the golden egg by remaining a viable 
operation and maximizing the trust‟s assets to 
pay claims.” 
In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d at 248 n.69 (quoting 140 
Cong. Rec. S4521-01, S4523 (Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of 
Senator Brown)); see also id. at 248 (The bankrupt company 
continues “to make future payments into the trust to provide 
an „evergreen‟ funding source for future asbestos 
claimants.”); but cf. Sander L. Esserman & David J. Parsons, 
The Case for Broad Access to 11 U.S.C. 524(g) in Light of the 
Third Circuit’s Ongoing Business Requirement Dicta in 
Combustion Engineering, 62 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 187 
(2006) (arguing that future payments are not always 
necessary and that in some cases, a present contribution of 
securities may be sufficient under § 524(g)).  Essentially, the 
§ 524(g) trust “recognizes the inherent equitable power of the 
bankruptcy courts to provide for equitable treatment of all of 
a debtor‟s creditors, including those having claims arising out 
of asbestos products.”  140 Cong. Rec. S4521-01, S4523 
(Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Senator Graham); see also In 
re. Federal-Mogul Global Inc., Nos. 09-2230 & 09-2231, 
2012 WL 1511773, at *1-3, 14-16 (3d Cir. May 1, 2012). 
 In contrast, the CADP system does not create a trust 
funded by Skinner‟s securities to pay future Asbestos 
Claimants, but rather, it creates a Plan Payment Fund funded 
by Asbestos Claimants to pay attorneys and other creditors.  
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There is no channeling injunction to protect the debtor or 
insurers from future claimants, and the debtor makes no 
contribution whatsoever to the trust, but rather plans to pull 
money from it.  Indeed, the only alleged benefit the CADP 
provides to Asbestos Claimants appears to be the ability to 
pursue claims through the CADP rather than through the 
court system. 
 We recognize that at times, a bankruptcy court‟s 
equitable powers under § 105(a) might allow it to confirm an 
asbestos trust not provided for by § 524(g), but its “general 
grant of equitable power . . . must be exercised within the 
parameters of the Code itself,” In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 
F.3d at 236, and for the purpose of “achiev[ing] fairness and 
justice in the reorganization process.”  Id. at 235 (internal 
quotation omitted); see also In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 
456 F.3d at 340 (Equity allows courts to “craft flexible 
remedies that, while not expressly authorized by the 
[Bankruptcy] Code, effect the result the Code was designed to 
obtain[.]” (quoting Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 
F.3d 548, 568 (3d Cir. 2003))).  However, we fail to see how 
the Bankruptcy Code‟s equitable purposes would be achieved 
by the Fifth Plan. 
 We do not here define the parameters of a bankruptcy 
court‟s equitable powers, nor determine that surcharges, or 
alternative forms of asbestos trusts, or other individual 
provisions of the Fifth Plan, are never permissible under § 
1129(a)(3).  However, under the circumstances of this plan, 
where:  (1) the debtor‟s bankruptcy is unrelated to asbestos 
litigation, (2) the debtor will not contribute to the Plan 
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Payment Fund but merely pull from it, (3) Asbestos 
Claimants provide the sole source of funding to the Plan 
Payment Fund through the Surcharge, (4) the Plan Payment 
Fund exists solely to pay off creditors and insurers rather than 
to pay future asbestos litigants or generate profits to do so, 
and where (5) the Surcharge creates an inherent conflict of 
interest while (6) the CADP process simultaneously strips 
Insurers of certain procedural and substantive rights without 
the protections of § 524(g), we find a lack of good faith as 
required for confirmation under § 1129(a)(3).  The mere 
provision of an alternative settlement process cannot 
outweigh our concerns.
8
 
                                              
8 Appellants respond with several non sequiturs.  They 
argue that they sought Insurers‟ help to develop a consensual 
plan, but that does not mean that the plan eventually proposed 
fairly achieved the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  They also argue that the surcharge is not problematic 
because it is an arms-length transaction and fully disclosed, 
but neither issue is dispositive as to whether a conflict-of-
interest or collusive type of system exists.  See, e.g., Moody v. 
Sec. Pacific Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 
1992) (noting that unfair influence may exist regardless of 
whether a transaction appears to be at arms-length); In re 
ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 39-43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) 
(finding a plan to be not in good faith despite the fact that 
Asbestos Claimants‟ control over the debtor was disclosed).  
Finally, Appellants argue that their plan is not in bad faith 
because it fulfills a purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (namely, 
maximizing value to creditors).  (Skinner Reply Br. at 2-4; 
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 Appellants fail to meet their burden of showing that 
the plan might be confirmable after further discovery or 
creditor voting.  No dispute of material fact remains that 
could affect this plan‟s good faith standing, and although 
creditor voting could potentially address certain concerns, 
such as CADP procedures, it cannot address the majority of 
the concerns and certainly cannot cure the inherent conflict of 
interest.  Thus, the lack of good faith pursuant to § 1129(a)(3) 
makes the Fifth Plan patently unconfirmable. 
C. 
 Finally, Appellants claim that the Bankruptcy Court 
abused its discretion by converting the Chapter 11 case to a 
Chapter 7.  We disagree.  After providing “notice and a 
hearing,” a bankruptcy court “may convert a case under 
[Chapter 11] to a case under Chapter 7 of this title or may 
dismiss a case under [Chapter 11], whichever is in the best 
                                                                                                     
Bartel‟s Br. at 37-38; Skinner‟s Br. at 26-27.)  However, the 
fact that there is at least one valid purpose to the Plan is not 
dispositive as the Plan could fulfill one specific purpose of 
the Code and yet be inconsistent with other overarching 
principles, or with the requirement that objectives and 
purposes of the Code must be fairly achieved. 
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interest of creditors and the estate, for cause.”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 1112(b) (2004).
9
 
 Section 1112(b) requires a two-step process in which 
the court first determines whether there is “cause” to convert 
or dismiss, and next chooses between conversion and 
dismissal based on “the best interest of creditors and the 
estate.”  § 1112(b); In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 
159 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999).  We review the decision to convert a 
case pursuant to § 1112(b) for abuse of discretion.  See id. at 
159 (reviewing for abuse of discretion the decision to dismiss 
a case pursuant to § 1112(b)); see also In re Albany Partners, 
Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 
determination of cause under § 1112(b) is subject to judicial 
discretion under the circumstances of each case.” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 As a threshold matter, the hearing on May 7, 2009 met 
§ 1112(b)‟s preliminary requirement for “notice and a 
hearing.”  The April 9, 2009 Order scheduling the May 7 
hearing stated that the issue of conversion would be 
considered.  Furthermore, the hearing provided parties with 
an opportunity to present their arguments regarding 
conversion.  Cf. In re Blumenberg, 263 B.R. 704, 716-17 
                                              
9 The 2005 and 2010 amendments to the statute require 
that in given circumstances “the court shall” convert or 
dismiss a case.  11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2005) (emphasis added); 
11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2011) (emphasis added).  See Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub.L. No. 109-8, § 1501, 119 Stat. 23, 216 (2005). 
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(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) (Even though a formal hearing was 
not held, the court found the “notice and hearing” 
requirement to be met because the debtor was provided with 
“ample opportunities through both extended oral argument 
and formal motion practice to explain why his bankruptcy 
case should not be dismissed.”). 
 Turning next to the two-step analysis under § 1112(b), 
we agree with the District Court that the Bankruptcy Court 
did not abuse its discretion in finding cause to convert the 
case to Chapter 7.  Section 1112(b) provides a non-exhaustive 
list of grounds for finding “cause” to convert or dismiss.  11 
U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)-(10)(2004); In re SGL Carbon Corp., 
200 F.3d at 160 (finding that the list is not exhaustive).  The 
list of examples includes “inability to effectuate a plan[.]”  11 
U.S.C. § 1112(b)(2) (2004).
10
  A court may also find cause 
where there is not “a reasonable possibility of a successful 
reorganization within a reasonable period of time.”  In re 
Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 572 (3d Cir. 1991).  The amount of 
time that is considered reasonable varies.  See, e.g., DCNC 
N.C. I, L.L.C. v. Wachovia Bank, Nos. 09-3775, 09-3776, 
2009 WL 3209728, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2009) (four 
months); In re Camden Ordnance Mfg. Co. of Ark., Inc., 245 
                                              
10 Although the statute no longer lists this as an 
example of “cause,” the amended statute does not apply in 
this case, and even if it did, the “„[i]nability to effectuate a 
plan‟ remains a viable basis for dismissal because the listed 
examples of cause are not exhaustive.”  DCNC N.C. I, L.L.C. 
v. Wachovia Bank, Nos. 09-3775, 09-3776, 2009 WL 
3209728, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2009). 
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B.R. 794, 797 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (three months); In re 
Halvajian, 216 B.R. 502, 513 (D.N.J. 1998) (22 months), 
aff’d, 168 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 We find that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that there was cause to convert on 
the basis that Appellants have been unable to propose a 
confirmable plan, and will be unable to do so in the future.  
See In re Am. Cap. Equip., LLC, 405 B.R. at 426-27.  The 
Fifth Plan is not feasible, and Appellants have been unable to 
create a plan that is not contingent on future litigation with an 
uncertain and speculative outcome.  Additionally, Appellants 
concede that the plan cannot be successful without a 
Surcharge, which, in this case, creates an inherent conflict of 
interest. 
 Appellants argue that they did not have reasonable 
time to effectuate a plan, given delays by Insurers, and the 
“complexities of mass-tort bankruptcy cases.”  However, 
Insurers were not the only cause for delay; Skinner sought to 
stay proceedings, missed filing deadlines, sought multiple 
extensions, and filed five Chapter 11 plans.  Furthermore, this 
case is not truly a “mass-tort bankruptcy case” despite 
Skinner‟s attempts to frame it as such.  Skinner‟s bankruptcy 
was not caused even in part by mass-tort personal injury 
claims, and Skinner seeks a settlement of the asbestos claims 
only in an attempt to access injured third parties‟ insurance 
recoveries.  Regardless, Skinner does not explain why even a 
complex case should be kept alive once it is clear that any 
plan will be futile. 
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 By the time this case was dismissed, Skinner had been 
given more than five years to propose a confirmable plan, and 
had been unable to do so.  In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. 
at 427.  A court “is not bound to clog its docket with 
visionary or impracticable schemes for resuscitation.”  In re 
Brown, 951 F.2d at 572 (quoting Tenn. Publ’g Co. v. Am. 
Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 18, 22 (1936)).  A court may permit a 
debtor to modify and resubmit its plan under § 1127(a), but is 
not necessarily required to do so, especially where 
modification would be futile.  See, e.g., In re Brauer, 80 B.R. 
903, 911 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (where bankruptcy court dismissed 
Chapter 11 case “without first resorting to lesser sanctions[,]” 
such “„omissions‟ were not an abuse of discretion”).  We 
agree with the reasoning that where “repeatedly unsuccessful 
attempts at confirmation are likely to generate enormous 
administrative costs, often without increasing the likelihood 
of success, § 1112(b) recognizes the court‟s ability to curtail 
the process through the ultimate conversion or dismissal of 
the case[,]” and to make sure the plan “does not outlive the 
likelihood of its usefulness.”  In re Rand, No. AZ-10-1160, 
No. 07-06801, 2010 WL 6259960, at *5 (9th Cir. B.A.P. Dec. 
7, 2010) (citing 3 Collier Bankr. Manual ¶ 1112.04[4][l] (3d 
ed. rev. 2010)).  Under the circumstances, the Bankruptcy 
Court gave Skinner ample time to develop a plan given that 
Skinner did not demonstrate “a reasonable possibility” of 
developing a confirmable Chapter 11 plan “within a 
reasonable period of time.”  In re Brown, 951 F.2d at 572. 
 Finally, once cause has been established, “the court 
may convert . . . or may dismiss a case under [Chapter 11], 
whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate[.]”  
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11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2004).  A bankruptcy court has “wide 
discretion” to “use its equitable powers” to “make an 
appropriate disposition of the case[.]”  In re Camden 
Ordnance, 245 B.R. at 803 (citing the legislative history of 
§ 1112(b)). 
 Here, the Bankruptcy Court did not address the best 
interest of creditors and the estate directly, but it is clear that 
it determined that no future plan would be able to be 
effectuated under Chapter 11.  The obvious result is that 
under the Bankruptcy Court‟s reasoning, neither creditors nor 
the estate could conceivably benefit if a Chapter 11 plan 
could never be effectuated.  Generally, bankruptcy courts 
should explicitly address the best interest of creditors and the 
estate under § 1112(b), but we find that the Bankruptcy Court 
did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances. 
 Prolonging this case will only burden the estate with 
mounting attorney and administrative fees.  Cf. Matter of 
Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 315 (7th Cir.1995) 
(“[N]either the trustee in bankruptcy nor the trustee‟s lawyer 
has a duty to collect an asset of the debtor‟s estate if the cost 
of collection would exceed the value of the asset.  His duty is 
to endeavor to maximize the value of the estate, which is to 
say the net assets.  The performance of this duty will 
sometimes require him to forbear attempting to collect a 
particular asset, because the costs of collection would exceed 
the asset‟s value.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).  A Chapter 7 bankruptcy can be accomplished 
more efficiently, thus halting the mounting liabilities against 
the estate.  Moreover, Skinner will not be discharged of its 
liabilities under Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1), and 
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Chapter 7 trustees have the ability to settle an estate‟s claims, 
including claims regarding insurance coverage.  See, e.g., 
Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 186 F.3d 
346, 347-48 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing settlement of a lawsuit 
by a Chapter 7 trustee); In re Turner, 274 B.R. 675, 681-82 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2002) (approving settlement agreed to when 
insurer‟s liability was unclear); Order Approving Settlement 
Agreement By and Between the Trustee and the Hartford 
Insurers, In re Peanut Corp. of Am., No. 09-bk-60452 (Bankr. 
W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2009) (settlement for insurance coverage for 
mass-tort claims).  Creditors may be unlikely to be paid under 
Chapter 7, but the status quo is no better, because Skinner 
cannot propose a confirmable plan under Chapter 11. 
 Furthermore, Asbestos Claimants‟ compensation in 
this case is not contingent on confirmation of a Chapter 11 
plan.  Asbestos Claimants‟ recovery will be unaffected by the 
type of bankruptcy that is approved.  Skinner‟s estate is 
defunct, and regardless of whether a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 
is approved, any asbestos-related personal injury recovery to 
be had will come from Insurers, who will not be released 
from liability due to Skinner‟s bankruptcy.  See 40 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 117; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3929.05; H.K. Porter 
Co., Inc. v. Pa. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 75 F.3d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 
1996) (“[U]nder Pennsylvania‟s „direct action‟ statute, [40 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 117,] tort victims may sue an insurer directly if 
the insured has gone bankrupt or become insolvent.”); Phila. 
Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 222 A.2d 493, 
494 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966) (“40 [Pa. Cons. Stat.] § 117, 
authorizes direct actions against an insurance liability carrier 
in the event of the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured.”); 
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Fisher v. Lewis, 567 N.E. 2d 276, 278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) 
(“[A]n insurance company can be held liable under its 
contract for a judgment against its insured notwithstanding 
the discharge in bankruptcy of the insured.”).  Thus, contrary 
to Appellants‟ argument, Insurers will not receive a windfall 
under Chapter 7.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
Bankruptcy Court‟s decision to convert this case to a Chapter 
7. 
IV. 
 In sum, we find that the Bankruptcy Court did not err 
in determining based on the disclosure statement hearing that 
the Fifth Plan was patently unconfirmable under § 1129(a)(3) 
because its success is entirely contingent on speculative 
future litigation, and because the Plan asks third-party 
Asbestos Claimants, who were not a cause of the bankruptcy, 
to serve as the sole funding source for attorneys and other 
creditors, under circumstances involving an inherent conflict 
of interest and inequitable procedural provisions.  The Fifth 
Plan is simply not confirmable, and given the apparent futility 
in Skinner‟s pursuit of a plan under Chapter 11, as well as the 
mounting liabilities against the estate, the Bankruptcy Court 
did not abuse its discretion by converting the case to Chapter 
7. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
